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Abstract
With the growing number of marketplaces and trading
partners in the e–commerce environment, software tools
designed to act on behalf of human traders are increas-
ingly used to automate trading activities. This paper de-
scribes a model for constructing trading engines which
are capable of concurrently participating in multiple inter-
related negotiations with heterogeneous protocols. These
tree–structured engines are configured by means of a single
generic synchronization construct which enables the incre-
mental composition of complex trading schemes, including
a number of well known strategies from the financial trading
domain. The construct is augmented by a priority–based
scheduling algorithm which selects a set of nodes for nego-
tiation based on their estimated profit, the time remaining
and the desired degree of concurrency. The model also pro-
vides iterative negotiation, which is essential in any com-
plex trading environment.
Keywords: trading activities, negotiation protocols, con-
current negotiations, synchronization
1 Introduction
Electronic marketplaces, especially over the Internet, al-
low an increasing number of trading activities to be auto-
mated. Online auction houses (eBay, Yahoo), online ex-
changes (World Chemical Exchange, e–STEEL), and elec-
tronic communication networks (Instinet, Island) now pro-
vide the basic infrastructure for programmatic product dis-
covery, quote polling, auctioning, bidding, order placement,
trade settlement, etc. Already, several tools for trading
partners discovery, price tracking, and automated bidding
(among others) have emerged.
The next step in this evolution is the automation of com-
posite trading activities. While a trading activity is usually
deployed to interact with at least one trading partner for
buying/selling a unit of an item, a composite trading ac-
tivity may need to interact with multiple trading partners
and marketplaces concurrently, to trade in multiple units, to
comply with temporal constraints, and to deal with special-
ized knowledge about market mechanisms and domain ar-
eas. Because of the subtle interactions between these char-
acteristics, executing composite trading activities require
rigorous planning and control, guided by carefully designed
strategies.
Trading strategies can be viewed as guidelines and re-
quirements to perform trading activities. Previous studies
on the design of strategies for composite trading activities
(e.g., [6] [13] [3]) assume an identical negotiation protocol
across all trading activities (e.g., English auction). They
are therefore not applicable to activities involving differ-
ent negotiation protocols. Our work addresses this issue by
proposing a common interface which is used to abstract the
internal dynamics of trading activities.
Based on this common interface, a coordination model is
presented, which can be used to configure trading engines
for concurrently participating in multiple negotiations. In
this model, composite trading activities are defined as as-
semblages of elementary and other composite trading activ-
ities governed by certain synchronization constraints.
An elementary trading activity handles a negotiation
with a given marketplace or trading partner. It acts as a
“wrapper”, in the sense that it hides (or rather abstracts
from) the specificities of the negotiation protocol imposed
by the trading partner. It also takes local decisions as to
whether a given proposal is acceptable or not. A com-
posite trading activity is specified using a generic synchro-
nization construct. A composite trading activity aggregates
and coordinates a number of other (elementary or compos-
ite) trading activities. Trading activities are also defined in
such a way that the trader can dynamically update the con-
straints during the negotiation, thereby enabling the elemen-
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tary trading activities to renegotiate at any time.
The execution of a composite trading activity is guided
by a scheduling algorithm which selects a set of nodes for
negotiation based on the estimated profit and the time fac-
tor. The nodes with higher profitability and less remain-
ing negotiation time are given higher priorities. Using this
priority–based scheduling algorithm, the model optimizes
the overall profit and minimizes the negotiation duration.
A brief introduction to the concept of elementary trading
activities, composite trading activities, and synchronization
is given in section 2. The generic synchronization construct,
the invariants, and the interface among of the components of
the synchronization model are presented in section 3. The
interface includes propagations of instructions, status, and
price related properties. Rules for the propagation of in-
structions and status are given in section 4 and 5. Rules
for propagation of price related properties (including profit
estimation) are presented in section 6. The prioritization
and generation of negotiation schedules based on the prop-
erties is presented in section 7. An application example of
the synchronization construct to trading scenarios is given
in section 8. In section 9 we briefly review related work
before summarizing our ideas in section 10.
2 Interrelated trading activities
A key element in specifying trading strategies is the un-
derstanding of how basic elements of a trading activity can
be defined. An Elementary Trading Activity (ETA) is de-
fined as a set of operations required for the purpose of reach-
ing a trading agreement (i.e. a deal). These operations are
typically structured in three phases: discovery of trading
partners, negotiation, and trade settlement. In this paper, we
focus on the negotiation, where synchronization between
several interrelated trading activities is required. An ETA is
described by the following attributes: the action to be taken
(eg. buy or sell), the description of the item (eg. name, the
number of units), the description of the trading partners, the
negotiation protocol deployed, and the temporal constraints.
An example of an ETA from the financial trading domain is:
“Negotiate with seller A to buy 2000 units of BHP with the
price of $10 using the bargaining protocol. The trade should
be executed before 12:00 13-Nov-2001 and after 10:00 13-
Nov-2001.”
A Composite Trading Activity (CTA) may comprise one
or more ETAs. For instance, a buy–sell CTA may include
two ETAs, one for buying and one for selling. ETAs within
a composite trading activity can be interrelated or indepen-
dent. There are at least two possible types of relationships
among two interrelated trading activities, complementary
and alternative.
Complementary: Two trading activities are complemen-
tary [11] when both of them have to be successful or none of
them should be successful. For instance, in bundle trading
(often found in the financial trading domain), a trader simul-
taneously purchases or sells an entire portfolio or a cross–
section of a portfolio [4]. Index fund managers, index ar-
bitragers, hedgers, and equity managers frequently employ
bundle trading to maintain the diversification in their port-
folio holdings. For example, a fund manager would like
to sell 60% of shares from 10000 units of BHP stock and
70% of shares from 20000 units of NOKIA stock. In order
to re–balance his/her portfolio, the fund manager is deter-
mined not to sell any stocks at all if one of these trades is
not successful. In other words, all selling activities should
be successful or none of them should be successful.
Alternative: Two trading activities are in an alternative
(also known as “substitutive” [11]) relationship when only
one of the activities has to be successful or none of them
should be successful. For instance, the manager of a pa-
per production factory may concurrently negotiate with two
suppliers for 500 tons of pulp and be planning to choose the
one with the lower acceptable offer. In this case, only one
of the two ETAs will be successful. Alternative ETAs also
occur in financial trading. In the US equity market, a sig-
nificant amount of trades are carried out through one-to-one
bargaining between brokers (e.g., in the so-called upstairs
markets [9]). In this context, a trader can be involved in two
alternative activities in which the same security is sought
from two different brokers: these negotiations are synchro-
nized so that at the end, the trader chooses the cheaper offer.
To the best of our knowledge, there is no tool supporting
concurrent negotiations involving complementary and alter-
native trading activities. CTAs such as bundle trading and
upstairs markets negotiation are still being carried out man-
ually. Furthermore, a CTA can involve both complementary
and alternative activities. An example is a fund manager
planning a bundle trade which involves simultaneous pur-
chase and sale of several stocks according to the following
plan:
• buy either 10000 units of BHP from seller S1 or 5000
units of Yahoo from seller S2 and
• sell either 20000 units of NOKIA to buyer B1 or 6000
units of Amazon to buyer B2.
This example suggests that a CTA can be viewed as a com-
position of ETAs and other CTAs as shown in figure 1.
ETAs within the same CTA can in principle be executed
concurrently. However, there are occasions during the ne-
gotiation when the ETAs need to be “synchronized” so that
a global decision is taken. For example, in figure 1, ETAs
(4) and (5) need to be synchronized to make sure that only
one of them will be successful. ETAs (6) and (7) also need
to be synchronized. In addition, both buying and selling ac-
tivities, which are depicted as CTAs (2) and (3), need to be
synchronized so that both of them will be successful or none
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Buy 10000 BHP from S1
or
Buy 5000 Yahoo from S2
Sell 20000 NOKIA to B1
or
Sell 6000 Amazon to B2(1)
(2)
(3)
AND
OR
OR
(( Buy 10000 BHP from S1)
or
(Buy 5000 Yahoo from S2 ))
and
(( Sell 20000 NOKIA to B1)
or
 (Sell 6000 Amazon to B2 ))
Sell 6000 Amazon to B2
(7)
Sell 20000 NOKIA to B1
(6)
Buy 5000 Yahoo from S2
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Figure 1. Nested bundle trading activity with
heterogeneous negotiation protocols
will. These observations suggest a model where trading ac-
tivities are represented as trees in which the leaves denote
ETAs and the nodes denote CTAs which are instantiations
of synchronization constructs.
3 Synchronization model
We introduce a generic synchronization construct
which is simple yet highly adaptable to different trading re-
quirements. Given (C1, .., Cm) (m > 0) nodes to be syn-
chronized, the synchronization construct [Min..Max] OUT
OF m is informally defined as “given m concurrent trad-
ing activities, at least Min activities and at most Max
activities are to be successful or none of them should
succeed”. The formal semantics of the synchronization
construct with Min = Max is given in [14] using pred-
icate/transition nets (PrT–nets). The bundle trading exam-
ple given in figure 1 can be modelled using synchronization
constructs as depicted in figure 2. The CTAs from figure 1
are replaced by appropriate constructs.
(1)
(2)
(3)
[2..2]
OUT OF 2
[1..1]
OUT OF 2
[1..1]
OUT OF 2 (4)
Buy 10000 BHP from S1
Buy 5000 Yahoo from S2
(5)
Sell 20000 NOKIA to B1
(6)
Sell 6000 Amazon to B2
(7)
User
Trading partner S1protocol A
Trading partner S2
Trading partner B1
Trading partner B2
protocol B
protocol C
protocol D
Common Interface Common Interface
Figure 2. Bundle trading with synchronization
constructs
An ETA (leaf node) can be either a seller or a buyer. In
the context of negotiation between an ETA and a trading
partner, we can classify the interactions between a ETA and
its trading partner(s) into three groups according to follow-
ing criteria; (a) only the ETA will send proposals, (b) only
the trading partner will send proposals, and (c) both parties
may send proposals. For instance, a buyer ETA in a Dutch
auction is not required to send proposals whereas a buyer
ETA in an English auction may send proposals to the trading
partner (in this case, the auctioneer). Once the proposal is
accepted, it is required to be honored by the sender. The po-
larity of an ETA with a negotiation protocol which requires
sending of proposals is said to be binding. The polarity of
an ETA is defined as non–binding if the associated protocol
is not required to send proposals. For instance, a buyer ETA
with the Dutch auction protocol is non–binding whereas a
seller ETA with the Dutch auction protocol is binding.
States: At any time, a node can be in one of six possible
states: idle and available for synchronization, negotiating,
stalled in negotiation but able to renegotiate under new con-
straints, ready–to–accept, successful in negotiation, and ne-
gotiation has ended and unable to renegotiate or continue.
The possible transitions among these states are depicted in
figure 3.
negotiating
(ngo)
ended
(end)
successful
(suc)stalled
(stl)
ready-to-accept
(rta)
idle
(idl)
Figure 3. Possible states of a node
In order to avoid inconsistencies, it is crucial to define
the invariants which must hold throughout the execution of
a synchronization model. We define the following notation
which will be used in specifying invariants.
Notation: Suppose that an internal node N is connected
with a set of child nodes N.Chi = {C1,..,Cm} and N.Min
and N.Max are the minimum and maximum number of
child nodes to be achieved. Given an internal node N , the
following functions return the set of child nodes which have
non–binding and binding polarity respectively.
nonbd(N) = {c ∈ N.Chi|c.Pol = nonbd} (1)
bd(N) = {c ∈ N.Chi|c.Pol = bd} (2)
We define the following functions which return the set of
child nodes of a particular state.
ngo(N) = {c ∈ N.Chi|c.State = ngo} (3)
suc(N) = {c ∈ N.Chi|c.State = suc} (4)
stl(N) = {c ∈ N.Chi|c.State = stl} (5)
rta(N) = {c ∈ N.Chi|c.State = rta} (6)
idl(N) = {c ∈ N.Chi|c.State = idl} (7)
end(N) = {c ∈ N.Chi|c.State = end} (8)
We also define functions which return the set of child nodes
based on the negotiating state and the polarity.
ngo nonbd(N) = ngo(N) ∩ nonbd(N) (9)
ngo bd(N) = ngo(N) ∩ bd(N) (10)
Structural invariants: The following condition describes
the valid range for the minimum and the maximum number
of child nodes to be achieved.
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C1. 0 < N.Min ≤ N.Max ≤ |N.Chi|
We must also ensure that sufficient non–binding child
nodes are available before the negotiation process begins.
Non–binding child nodes are essential to achieve the re-
quired number of child nodes without actually being over-
comitted. For instance, suppose an internal node has two
non–binding child nodes and one binding child and the syn-
chronization assigned is [3..3] OUT OF 3. To achieve at
least three child nodes or none, an internal node may start
negotiating with two non–binding child nodes. Suppose that
during the negotiation, both these child nodes have received
acceptable proposals from their respective trading partners.
As a result, their states are changed into ready–to–accept.
Now the internal node can authorize the binding child node
to negotiate. If the binding child node is successful, the
two non–binding child nodes are instructed to accept. In
this way, the minimum number of child nodes is guaran-
teed. If the binding child fails, the two waiting non–binding
child nodes are instructed to abort so that none of them will
be successful. This example demonstrates that there must
be at least (N.Min − 1) non–binding child nodes to fulfill
the minimum number of child nodes for achievement. This
condition is captured by the following precondition.
C2. |nonbd(N)| ≥ N.Min− 1
Negotiation invariants: There are certain conditions
which must hold throughout the negotiation. The follow-
ing invariant states that if an internal node has some suc-
cessful child nodes, it must have sufficient ready–to–accept
child nodes to guarantee the successful achievement of the
minimum number of child nodes (N.Min).
I1. |suc(N)| > 0 ⇒ |rta(N)| ≥ N.Min− |suc(N)|
The following invariant states that if there are insuffi-
cient child nodes to guarantee the successful completion of
N.Min child nodes, no child node with binding polarity
should be asked to negotiate.
I2. (|suc(N)|=0∧|rta(N)|<N.Min−1)⇒|ngo bd(N)|=0
To prevent the total number of successful child nodes ex-
ceeding the maximum requirement, the total number of cur-
rently negotiating child nodes which have binding polarity
must not exceed the number of child nodes which are still
allowed to be successful. This condition is captured by the
following invariant.
I3. |ngo bd(N)| ≤ N.Max− |suc(N)|
Common interface: ETAs within the synchronization
model may employ different protocols to negotiate with dif-
ferent trading partners. Negotiation protocols frame the in-
teractions between negotiating parties: what deals can be
made and what sequences of offers are allowed [10]. Each
negotiation protocol has its own distinct characteristics. For
instance, in a Dutch auction the auctioneer begins with an
initial high price and the price descends until someone states
a desire to buy at the current price. The sequences of inter-
actions between two participants in a negotiation are dif-
ferent from one protocol to another. Therefore, a generic
homogeneous interface is required to invoke, monitor, and
control these trading activities.
In the generic interface (depicted as filled rectangles in
figure 2), two types of messages are defined: instructions
and reports. The type of instructions which can be sent are:
(1) end all ongoing negotiation processes (below), (2) start
all negotiation processes (below), (3) renegotiate all pro-
cesses which are in stalled, negotiating or ready–to–accept
state, and (4) accept negotiation processes which are ready
to accept. There are two types of reports: status reports
(successful, ended, ready–to–accept, stalled, polarity) and
property reports (limit price, quote, profit, temporal con-
straints). Instructions are always propagated downwards
and reports are propagated upwards. The following sec-
tions deal with the propagation of instructions, states, and
property reports.
4 Propagation of instructions
Instructions are issued by the user or the internal nodes
and propagated downwards. The negotiation process begins
when the user issues the ‘start’ instruction to the root. When
an idle internal node receives a ‘start’ instruction from its
parent node (or the user), it determines which child nodes
should be instructed for negotiation using a priority–based
algorithm described in section 8 and sends ‘start’ instruc-
tions to those child nodes. The state of the internal node
is then changed into ‘negotiating’. This process is repeated
at every internal node until instructions reach the leaf level.
When a leaf node receives a ‘start’ instruction, it changes
its state into ‘negotiating’ and begins negotiating with the
designated trading partner(s).
During the negotiation, the user may issue the ‘renegoti-
ate’ instruction with a new set of constraints (eg. new limit
price) to the root of the tree. An internal node will only
process the ‘renegotiate’ instruction if it is currently in ne-
gotiating, stalled, or ready–to–accept state. Otherwise, the
instruction is simply ignored. If the internal node is in one
of the above states, it immediately sends ‘renegotiate’ in-
structions to those of its child nodes which are also in ne-
gotiating, stalled, or ready–to–accept states. This process
is repeated at every affected internal node until instructions
reach the leaf level. When a leaf node receives a ‘renegoti-
ate’ instruction, it sets its state to ‘negotiating’ and proceeds
the negotiation with the new set of constraints.
If an internal node is in the ready–to–accept state and re-
ceives an ‘accept’ instruction from its parent node (or the
user), it sends the ‘accept’ instructions to those of its child
nodes which are also in the ready–to–accept state. The in-
ternal node also changes its state into ‘successful’. This
process is repeated until the instructions reach the leaf level.
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When a leaf node receives an ‘accept’ instruction, it changes
its state into ‘successful’ and sends the ‘accept–proposal’
message to its trading partner(s).
During the negotiation, the user may decide to terminate
the negotiation process by issuing the ‘end’ instruction to
the root. If an internal node receives an ‘end’ instruction, it
changes its state into ‘ended’ and forwards the instruction to
all of its affected child nodes. When a leaf node receives an
‘end’ instruction, it withdraws from the current negotiating
process and changes its own state into ‘ended’.
5 Propagation of state and polarity
The current negotiation status and the polarities
are determined at the leaf nodes and propagated up-
wards. Before the negotiation process begins, an internal
node as well as all its child nodes are in the idle state
(|idl(N)| = |N.Chi|).
State transition and polarity of leaf nodes: An idle leaf
node changes its state into ‘negotiating’ when it receives a
‘start’ instruction from its parent node. During the negoti-
ation, a node with binding polarity may send proposals (or
bids) to its trading partners. If the proposal is accepted, the
state of the node is changed into ‘successful’. If the polarity
is non–binding, the node may only receive proposals from
the trading partners. If the proposal received by the node
is acceptable with respect to the limit price, the state of the
node is changed into ‘ready–to–accept’.
The state of the non–binding node becomes ‘stalled’
when the proposal received from the trading partner is
greater than the limit price (for a buying node), or the pro-
posal received is less than the limit price (for a selling node).
The state of the binding node becomes ‘stalled’ when the
next proposal to be sent to the trading partner no longer sat-
isfies the limit set by the user. A node also becomes ‘stalled’
when it cannot proceed due to the temporal constraints set
by the user. The state of a node is changed into ‘ended’
when it receives an ‘end–of–negotiation’ message from its
trading partner or an ‘end’ instruction is received from its
parent node. Whenever a node changes into a new state, it
is immediately reported to its parent node.
The polarity of a leaf node is defined by: (a) the
intended action of the node (“buy” or “sell”), and (b) the
negotiation protocols used (e.g. English auction, Dutch
auction, continuous double auction). Since the polarity of
a leaf node does not change, it is only reported once to the
parent node before the negotiation begins.
Internal nodes: Based on the states and polarities of its
child nodes, an internal node derives its own state and po-
larity based on the following rules. A node is considered
as successful if and only if the number of successful child
nodes is between the desired minimum and maximum.
S1. N.State = suc ⇔ N.Min ≤ |suc(N)| ≤ N.Max
A node is considered as stalled if and only if the number
of child nodes which are in the ended state is sufficiently
low that it is still possible to continue, and the total num-
ber of child nodes which are in the ended or stalled state
is sufficiently high so that it is impossible to achieve the
minimum number of child nodes required to be successful,
unless some negotiation parameters are changed.
S2. N.State = stl ⇔ |end(N)| + |stl(N)| > |N.Chi| −
N.Min ≥ |end(N)|
A node is considered as ended if and only if the total
number of child nodes in the ended state is greater than or
equal to the maximum number of child nodes allowed to be
in the ended state.
S3. N.State = end ⇔ |end(N)| > |N.Chi| −N.Min
A node is considered as ready–to–accept if and only if it
does not have enough successful child nodes and there are
sufficient ready–to–accept child nodes to achieve the mini-
mum requirement (N.Min).
S4. N.State = rta ⇔ |rta(N)| ≥ N.Min ∧ |suc(N)| <
N.Min
A node is considered as negotiating if and only if there
is at least one negotiating child node and the node itself is
not in successful, stalled, ready–to–accept, or ended state.
S5. N.State = ngo ⇔ |ngo(N)| > 0 ∧ N.State /∈
{suc, stl, rta, end}
A node is non–binding if and only if it can be asked to
negotiate in a non–binding way. (To negotiate in a non–
binding way is to act in such a way that a successful state
cannot be reached without first going through the ready–to–
accept state.) A node is defined as non–binding if and only
if there are no negotiating child nodes with binding polarity
and there are sufficient non–binding child nodes (not in the
ended state) to achieve the minimum requirement.
P1. N.Pol = nonbd ⇔ |ngo bd(N)| = 0 ∧ |{c ∈
N.Chi|c.State = end ∧ c.Pol = nonbd}| ≥ N.Min
Since there are only two possible polarities, we define
a node as binding if its polarity is not non–binding. After
an internal node has derived its own state and polarity, it
reports them to its parent node. The process is repeated
whenever there is a change in the state of its child nodes.
6 Propagation of price related properties
During the execution of a synchronization model, there
is a need to compare or select nodes in terms of their price
related properties such as limit price, quote, transaction
cost, and estimated profit. Since those properties are di-
rectly available at the leaf nodes, it is necessary to define
rules to propagate these properties from leaf nodes to the
upper levels of the tree. The calculation of price related
properties for an internal node is based on the concept of
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valid negotiation arrangement: a set of child nodes capable
of changing the node into a successful state.
Definition 6.1. A valid negotiation arrangement v of an in-
ternal node N is a subset of N.Chi such that:
1. v only consists of child nodes from idle, stalled, nego-
tiating, successful or ready–to–accept states.
|{c ∈ v|c.State = end}| = 0
2. v must include all the successful child nodes.
suc(N) ⊆ v
3. The cardinality of v must be between the minimum
and maximum number of child nodes required to be
successful. N.Min ≤ |v| ≤ N.Max
4. The total number of binding child nodes within v must
not violate the invariants previously defined. Accord-
ing to I2, the total number of binding child nodes in v
is zero if there are insufficient child nodes to guarantee
the achievement of the minimum requirement.
(|suc(N)| = 0∧ |rta(N)| < N.Min− 1)⇒bd(v)=0
5. According to I3, the total number of binding child
nodes in v must not exceed the number of child nodes
which are still allowed to be achieved.
bd(v) ≤ N.Max− |suc(N)|
Definition 6.2. A valid negotiation arrangement lv of an
internal node N is a lower bound valid negotiation arrange-
ment iff: |lv| = N.Min
Limit price: The limit price of a leaf node is set by the
trader prior to the negotiation. Its value is static throughout
the negotiation unless it is modified by the user. The limit
price of a selling leaf node indicates the minimum amount
the user is expected to gain whereas the limit price of a buy-
ing leaf node indicates the maximum amount that the user
is willing to spend. The limit price of a selling leaf node is
set to be positive and the limit price of a buying leaf node
is set to be negative. For the purpose of simplification, we
define a predicate itn(N) which is true if the node N is an
internal node (itn(N) ≡ |N.Chi| > 0). The limit price of
an internal node is 0 if its state is ended.
L1. (itn(N) ∧N.State = end) ⇒ N.Lim = 0
The limit price of an internal node whose state is suc-
cessful is equivalent to the sum of its successful child nodes’
limit prices.
L2. (itn(N) ∧N.State = suc) ⇒ N.Lim = ∑
c∈suc(N)
c.Lim
A lower bound valid negotiation arrangement is a valid
negotiation arrangement which is only able to achieve the
minimum requirement (N.Min). For a given set of child
nodes, there can be more than one lower bound valid ne-
gotiation arrangement. The limit price of an internal node
represents the minimum amount the node is expecting to
gain or the maximum amount the node is willing to spend
by achieving the minimum requirement. Therefore the
limit price of an internal node which state is idle, negoti-
ating, stalled or ready–to–accept is equivalent to the sum
of the limit price of the child nodes within a negotiation
arrangement which is the minimum among all available
lower bound valid negotiation arrangements. Suppose that
lbset(N) is the set of all lower bound valid negotiation ar-
rangements of N .
L3. (itn(N) ∧ N.State /∈ {end, suc}) ⇒ N.Lim =
min
v∈lbset(N)
(
∑
c∈v
c.Lim)
Profit: The profit of a node in general is an indication of
how attractive the current quote is with respect to the limit
price. The profit of a leaf node returns a positive value when
the current quote is higher than the limit price for a selling
action or the current price is lower than the limit price for a
buying action. The profit of a leaf node returns a negative
value when the current quote is lower than the limit price
for a selling action or the current quote is higher than the
limit price for a buying action. Positive profit represents
a desirable position whereas a negative profit represent an
undesirable position to the trader. The profit also need to
take into account the transaction cost. We define the profit
of a node (regardless of whether it is a leaf or an internal
node) as follows:
F1. N.Pro = N.Quo−N.Lim−N.Tsc
Maximum profit valid negotiation arrangement: Sup-
pose that vna(N) is the set of all valid negotiation arrange-
ments of N . We define the function mpv(N) of an internal
node N , which returns a valid negotiation arrangement that
maximizes the overall profit of N as follows:
mpv(N) yields a randomly chosen v ∈ vna(N) such that∑
c∈v
c.Pro = max
i∈vna(N)
(
∑
j∈i
j.Pro)
Transaction cost: Transaction cost is one of the impor-
tant issues in any trading situation. For instance, in finan-
cial trading, transaction costs imposed by the brokers and
exchanges pose a significant overhead to both buyers and
sellers. In our model, we assume that every leaf node has
information about the estimated transaction cost. We also
assume that transaction cost is zero for any unsuccessful
deals. The following rule defines the transaction cost of an
internal node which state is ended.
T1. (itn(N) ∧N.State = end) ⇒ N.Tsc = 0
The transaction cost of an internal node whose state is
successful is equivalent to the sum of its successful child
nodes’ transaction costs. This situation is captured by the
following rule:
T2. (itn(N) ∧N.State = suc) ⇒ N.Tsc = ∑
c∈suc(N)
c.Tsc
The estimated transaction cost of an internal node whose
state is idle, negotiating, stalled or ready–to–accept is
equivalent to the sum of the transaction costs of the ele-
ments of the maximum profit valid negotiation arrangement.
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T3. (itn(N)∧N.State/∈{end, suc}) ⇒N.Tsc =∑
c∈mpv(N)
c.Tsc
Quote: The quote at a seller leaf node is equivalent to the
highest proposal received from a buyer trading partner and
the quote at a buyer leaf node is equivalent to the lowest pro-
posal received from a seller trading partner. Before any ne-
gotiation process begins, elementary trading activities (leaf
nodes) will obtain the initial quotes from the trading part-
ners. For instance, in an English auction, the initial price
declared by the auctioneer can be treated as an initial quote.
In a Dutch auction, the auctioneer may declare a relatively
high initial price which can also be treated as an initial quote
by the bidders. In bargaining protocols, the trading activi-
ties may request their respective trading partners to send ini-
tial quotes before the negotiation process begins. The quote
of a selling leaf node is set to be positive and the quote of
a buying leaf node is set to be negative. The following rule
defines the quote of an internal node which state is ended.
Q1. (itn(N) ∧N.State = end) ⇒ N.Quo = 0
The quote of an internal node which state is successful is
equivalent to the sum of its successful child nodes’ quotes.
Q2. (itn(N) ∧N.State = suc) ⇒ N.Quo = ∑
c∈suc(N)
c.Quo
The quote of an internal node which state is idle, nego-
tiating, stalled, or ready–to–accept is equivalent to the sum
of the quote values of the elements of the maximum profit
valid negotiation arrangement.
Q3. (itn(N)∧N.State/∈{end, suc})⇒N.Quo=∑
c∈mpv(N)
c.Quo
7 Prioritization and scheduling
When a trader is able to negotiate with several trading
partners to fulfill an objective, then naturally a schedule is
required to decide with which partners to negotiate. When
this principle is applied to a tree structured trading activity,
each internal node has to decide which of its child nodes
should be allowed to negotiate. As a result, a scheduling
mechanism is required to choose the combination of activi-
ties (or nodes) which is likely to produce an optimum result.
7.1 Prioritizing child nodes for negotiation
Nodes will be selected by their parent nodes for nego-
tiation based on the priority value θ. Nodes with higher
priority value are more likely to be selected for negotiation.
The priority value θN is computed as a weighted sum of the
priorities relative to the expected profit and the time factor.
The overall priority θN of node N is defined as follows:
R1. θN = ωP θPN + ωT θTN
ωP and ωT being the weights assigned by the user to each of
the two factors. Weights are assigned to the root of the tree
and replicated to all internal nodes. The user may require
that ωP + ωT = 1, although this is not a requirement of the
model.
Priority based on profit factor (P): Profit factor allows
an internal node to prioritize its child nodes in terms of their
profit value. The profit factor of a node is the normalization
of the profit of that node with respect to the other siblings
of node N . Suppose that Z is the parent of N and abs is the
absolute value function:
R2. N ∈ Z.Chi ⇒ θPN =
N.Pro+abs( min
c∈Z.Chi
c.Pro)
 
c∈Z.Chi
(c.Pro+abs( min
c∈Z.Chi
c.Pro))
Suppose that an internal node has four child nodes which
profits are -4, -2, 4, and 6. According to R2, their respective
priority value are 0, 0.1, 0.4, and 0.5.
Priority based on external time factor (T): We assume
that all the leaf nodes (elementary trading activities) have
information about their respective trading partner end time.
This concept of end time is propagated up to the root of the
tree based on the following rule.
R3. N.EndTime = max
c∈N.Chi
c.EndTime
The external time factor allows an internal node to prior-
itize its child nodes with respect to the end time. Nodes with
fast approaching end times are given higher priorities. Sup-
pose that currenttime and N.EndTime are represented as
the number of time units relative to some common origin.
R4. currenttime < N.EndT ime ⇒ θTN = currenttimeN.EndTime
If the current time has passed the deadline, the priority be-
comes 0.
R5. currenttime ≥ N.EndT ime ⇒ θTN = 0
7.2 Total number of child nodes for negotiation
Once child nodes are prioritized, a set of child nodes
(called the negotiation schedule) has to be selected for nego-
tiation. In certain situations, the total number of child nodes
selected can have significant impact on the market. Suppose
that a trader is planning to buy a large number of identical
items (e.g. 100000 units of a particular stock) by deploying
five alternative non–binding trading activities which are as-
signed to five different sellers. If all activities are selected
for negotiation, it may significantly increase the apparent
demand of the item, which is probably visible to all market
participants. In addition, withdrawing from the negotiation
for those activities which fail to secure the deals may also
affect his/her reputation. In order to avoid this situation, the
degree of concurrency factor (CF ) is used to control the
total number of child nodes which are going to be selected
for negotiation at one time. Just as with the profit and time
factors in the previous section, the CF is assigned to the
root of the tree by the user before the negotiation process
begins and replicated to all internal nodes. We require that
0 ≤ CF ≤ 1.
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Non–binding child nodes: The total number of non–
binding child nodes for negotiation ϕnb is equal to the num-
ber of child nodes still required to be successful (to achieve
Min) plus an additional number of child nodes determined
based on the concurrency factor. Suppose that x is the mini-
mum number of child nodes that need to be selected in order
to satisfy the minimum requirement and y is the total num-
ber of non–binding child nodes able to negotiate.
x = max((N.Min− |suc(N)| − |rta(N)|), 0)
y = |{c ∈ N.Chi|c.Pol = nonbd∧c.State ∈ {idl, ngo}}|
If the number of available non–binding child nodes ex-
ceeds the number of child nodes needed to satisfy the min-
imum requirement, the number of non–binding child nodes
to be instantiated is equal to the number of child nodes re-
quired to satisfy the minimum requirement plus the addi-
tional number of child nodes dictated by the concurrency
factor.
N1. y ≥ x ⇒ ϕNnb = x + (y − x)× CFN
If the number of available non–binding child nodes is
less than the minimum requirement, all the available non–
binding child nodes should be instantiated for negotiation.
N2. y < x ⇒ ϕNnb = y
Number of binding child nodes for negotiation: Ac-
cording to I2, the total number of binding child nodes for
instantiation ϕb should be zero if there is are sufficient
successful or ready–to–accept child nodes to guarantee the
achievement of the minimum requirement (N.Min).
N3. (|suc(N)| = 0∧ |rta(N)| < N.Min− 1) ⇒ ϕNb = 0
If there are sufficient successful or ready–to–accept child
nodes to guarantee the achievement of the minimum re-
quirement, the total number of binding child nodes for in-
stantiation ϕb is bounded by N.Max. Suppose that x is the
number of child nodes that can still be achieved and y is the
number of binding child nodes available.
x = N.Max− |suc(N)|
y = |{c ∈ N.Chi|c.Pol = bd ∧ c.State ∈ {idl, ngo}}|
Using the degree of concurrency, the total number of
binding child nodes for negotiation can be defined as fol-
lows:
N4. ¬(|suc(N)| = 0 ∧ |rta(N)| < N.Min− 1) ⇒ ϕNb =
min(x, y)× CFN
7.3 Generating the negotiation schedule
Based on the priority value θ and the total number of
child nodes to be instantiated, the algorithm to generate the
negotiation schedule SN of an internal node N is described
as follows:
- Create an empty schedule SN ;
- Create sets Lb and Lnb which contain all binding and non-
binding child nodes c with c.State ∈ {idl, ngo};
- Calculate ϕNb and ϕNnb;
- For(i = 1 to ϕNb ){Remove child node Ci with the highest
priority value from Lb and add Ci to SN ;}
- For(j = 1 to ϕNnb){Remove child node Cj with the highest
priority value from Lnb and add Cj to SN ;}
- Return SN ;
Notice that the negotiation schedule can be empty if there
are not enough idle or negotiating nodes to achieve the min-
imum number of child nodes. In this case, the user will be
notified that some of the nodes in the stalled state need to
be “unstalled” before the negotiation can proceed.
8 Case study
Suppose that a fund manager is planning to rebalance
a portfolio. The research department has recently down-
graded some stocks from the banking and telecommunica-
tions sectors based on their weaker than expected quarterly
reports and has upgraded some of the stocks from the prop-
erty, transportation and energy sectors due to their strong
earning reports. The fund manager’s current assets are cal-
culated based on the number of units available and the limit
price per unit decided by the fund manager. The fund man-
ager is planning to reduce the assets in the banking sector
by 70% and the telecommunications sector by 100%. The
fund manager is planning to buy six stocks from the up-
graded sectors with the capital gained from the selling.
In the banking sector, the fund manager has 8000 units
of HSBC, 20000 of Dah Sing Financial, and 27000 units of
Wing Lung Bank. The fund manager is planning to sell any
two combination of shares so that the banking asset will
be reduced by approximately 70%. Synchronization con-
struct n1 in figure 4 ensures that two selling activities will
be successful or none of them will be successful. In the tele-
communcations sector, the fund manager has 30000 units of
China Mobile and 160000 units of China Unicon. In order
to reduce by 100%, both stocks will be sold. Synchroniza-
tion construct n2 in figure 4 ensures that both selling activ-
ities will be successful or none of them will be successful.
Synchronization construct n6 ensures that both n1 and n2
will be successful or none of them will be successful.
For the upgraded sectors (property, transportation, and
energy), the fund manager is planning to buy one of the
stocks from each sector. Synchronization constructs n3, n4,
and n5 ensure that only one of the buying activities in each
sector will be successful. Subsequently, synchronization
construct n7 ensures that all buying activities will be suc-
cessful or none of them will be successful. As part of the
portfolio rebalancing, the fund manager is determined not to
transact any deals unless all buying and selling requirements
are satisfied. Synchronization construct n8 ([2..2] OUT OF
2) from figure 4 ensures that all buying and selling activities
will be successful or none of them will be successful.
We have collected intra–day data from the Hong Kong
Stock Market for the stocks described in our example.
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Portfolio
Rebalancing
n8
State = ngo
Limit = 25200
Quote = 10575
TCost = 15404.56
Profit = -30029.56
Priority = 1
Downgraded
Sectors
Tele-communication
Banking
Action  = sell
Units = 8000
Limit/P = 92
Norminal/P = 90.25
T1: Sell 8000
HSBC at $92.00
T2: Sell 20000
Dah Sing at
$35.00
T4: Sell 30000
China Mobile
at $21.00
T5: Sell 160000
China Unicon at
$6.00
[2..2]
OUT OF 2
n2
[2..2]
OUT OF 3
n1
[2..2]
OUT OF 2
n6
Action  = sell
Units = 20000
Limit/P = 35
Norminal/P = 36
State = rta
Limit = 700000
Quote = 720000
TCost = 1800
Profit = 18200
Priority = 0.67
Action  = sell
Units = 27000
Limit/P = 28
Norminal/P = 28.1
State = rta
Limit = 756000
Quote = 758700
TCost = 1896.75
Profit = 803.25
Priority = 0.33
Action  = sell
Units = 30000
Limit/P = 21
Norminal/P = 21.05
State = rta
Limit = 630000
Quote = 631500
TCost = 1578.75
Profit = -78.75
Priority = 0
Action  = sell
Units = 160000
Limit/P = 6
Norminal/P = 6.1
State = rta
Limit = 960000
Quote = 976000
TCost = 2440
Profit = 13560
Priority = 1
State = ngo
Limit = 736000
Quote = 722000
TCost = 1805
Profit = -15805
Priority  = 0
T3: Sell 27000
Wing Lung at
$28.00
State = rta
Limit = 1436000
Quote = 1478700
TCost = 3696.75
Profit = 39003.25
Priority = 0.74
State = rta
Limit = 3026000
Quote = 3086200
TCost = 7715.5
Profit = 52484.5
Priority = 1
State = rta
Limit = 1590000
Quote = 1607500
TCost = 4018.75
Profit = 13481.25
Priority = 0.26
[2..2]
OUT OF 2
Energy
Upgraded
Sectors
Property
T6:  Buy 20300
SHK Property
at $50.00
T7:  Buy 17500
Cheung Kong
at $58.00
T8: Buy 16000
China Mortor
Bus at $50.00
T9: Buy 100000
MTR at $8
T10: Buy 107800
SINOPAC at
$1.10
T11: Buy 847000
PetroChina
at $1.40
[1..1]
OUT OF 2
n5
[1..1]
OUT OF 2
n4
[1..1]
OUT OF 2
n3
[3..3]
OUT OF 3
n7
Action  = buy
Units = 20300
Limit/P = -50
Norminal/P = -52.75
State = ngo
Limit = -1015000
Quote = -1070825
TCost = 2677.06
Profit = -58502.06
Priority = 0
Action  = buy
Units = 17500
Limit/P = -58
Norminal/P = -56.75
State = rta
Limit = -1015000
Quote = -993125
TCost = 2482.81
Profit = 19392.19
Priority = 1
Action  = buy
Units = 16000
Limit/P = -50
Norminal/P = -50.75
State = ngo
Limit = -800000
Quote = -812000
TCost = 2030
Profit = -14030
Priority = 0.87
Action  = buy
Units = 100000
Limit/P = -8
Norminal/P = -8.95
State = ngo
Limit = -800000
Quote = -895000
TCost = 2237.5
Profit = -97237.5
Priority = 0.13
Action  = buy
Units = 107800
Limit/P = -1.1
Norminal/P = -1.2
State = ngo
Limit = -1185800
Quote = -1293600
TCost = 3234
Profit = -111034
Priority = 0.44
Action  = buy
Units = 847000
Limit/P = -1.4
Norminal/P = -1.5
State = ngo
Limit = -1185800
Quote = -1270500
TCost = 3176.25
Profit = -87876.25
Priority = 0.56
Transportation
State = ngo
Limit = -800000
Quote = -812000
TCost = 2030
Profit = -14030
Priority = 0.41
State = rta
Limit = -1015000
Quote = -993125
TCost = 2482.81
Profit = 19392.19
Priority = 0.59
State = ngo
Limit = -3000800
Quote = -3075625
TCost = 7689.06
Profit = -82514.06
Priority = 0
State = ngo
Limit = -1185800
Quote = -1270500
TCost = 3176.25
Profit = -87876.25
Priority = 0
Figure 4. Data being propagated at 10:10AM on November 28, 2002
Minute by minute historical nominal prices are used as the
quotes and fed into the synchronization model. The snap-
shot of the data propagation within a particular trading day
is depicted in figure 4. Transaction cost at leaf nodes is
estimated as 0.25% of quote value. Since it is financially
infeasible to test (bid) with the real market, we simplify the
procedure in the propagation of state. If the quote of a sell-
ing leaf node is greater than the limit price or the quote of a
buying leaf node is less than the limit price per unit, the state
is set to be ready–to–accept. Otherwise, the leaf node is de-
fined as negotiating. Based on the state of the leaf nodes,
the state of the internal nodes are determined according to
the rules defined in section 5. For instance, in figure 4, n1
is in ready–to–accept state since at least two of its children
(T2 and T3) are in ready–to–accept states. However, n8 is
in negotiating state since only one of its child nodes (n6) is
in ready–to–accept state.
Limits, quotes, transaction costs, and profits are calcu-
lated based on the rules described in section 6 and propa-
gated up to the root. The priority value indicates how desir-
able a node is compared to its siblings in terms of potential
profit. We omitted the calculation of the external time factor
since all the trading activities have a uniform end time im-
posed by the market. For instance, trading task T2 in figure
4 has the highest priority since the profit of T2 is the highest
among its siblings. This example shows how price related
properties can be propagated during the synchronization of
interrelated trading activities. These properties allow the
model to make a projection of the maximum profit.
9 Related work
The Michigan Internet AuctionBot [15] is one of the ear-
liest prototypes allowing bidding by human bidders as well
as software agents. The AuctionBot is a configurable auc-
tion server which manages a large number of simultaneous
auctions. In the first Trading Agent Competition (TAC) [8],
participant agents bid in simultaneous English auctions for
hotel rooms. These hotel rooms have to be packaged with
flights and entertainment tickets so as to maximize their util-
ity. The scenario from the competition differs from ours, in
that the agents in [8] are free to purchase any number of
hotel rooms whereas our synchronization construct is de-
signed to achieve a specified range of deals.
Preist et al. [13] have proposed a coordination algorithm
for an agent bidding in multiple English auctions for m
identical units of an item. The algorithm ensures that the
agent makes “at most” m purchases at the end. Their ap-
proach differs from ours in at least 2 ways. First, in [13]
there is no mechanism to allow dynamic revision of con-
straints during the negotiation. Second, our approach pro-
vides modular compositions of complex trading activities.
Anthony et al. [2] have proposed a series of tactics as sets
of decision functions for calculating future bids for an agent
bidding in multiple heterogenous auctions for a single item.
The agent considered in [2] selects one auction at a time
to bid for a single item. In contrast to [2], our approach
performs concurrent negotiations to achieve multiple units
of the same or different items.
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Traditional database transaction processing [7] and ad-
vanced transaction models [5] address issues such as consis-
tency, correctness and recovery for transactional tasks. Al-
though the negotiation phase of a trading task is clearly dif-
ferent from a transactional task over a database, the multi–
process coordination model described in this paper can be
seen as an extension of the nested transaction model [12]
which allows for repeated locking of the resources by ele-
mentary trading activities and internal nodes. Although the
ready–to–accept state during the negotiation is somewhat
similar to placing a lock on a data item in a database, the
analogy stops there, since locking a data item does not have
the same implications as locking a deal with a trading part-
ner. Unlike transactional tasks over databases, rolling back
or compensating a committed trading activity is impractical
due to the possibility of financial loss.
To the best of our knowledge, the only commercial solu-
tion that provides a language for specifying trading strate-
gies is TradeStation [1], which is intended for financial ap-
plications. EasyLanguage from TradeStation Technologies
is a high–level programming language designed for analyz-
ing securities data time–series, implementing trading rules
and associated actions. However, it does not provide a direct
solution to implement strategies which involve interrelated
trading activities. For instance, there are no provisions to
express conditional bids (e.g. complementary bids).
10 Conclusion
This paper described a novel model for synchronizing in-
terrelated trading activities involving different forms of ne-
gotiation. A special interface is defined to homogenize the
trading activities involved. In order to specify trading strate-
gies, a generic synchronization construct is introduced. The
synchronization construct also provides iterative negotia-
tion capabilities which are essential in any complex trad-
ing environment. Rules for propagation of price and time
related properties have been formalized. A priority–based
scheduling algorithm which selects child nodes for negotia-
tion based on the overall profit and the external time factor
has been discussed.
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